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In the United States today, there is at least one credit bureau file, and probably three, for 
every credit-using individual in the country.  Over 2 billion items of information are 
added to these files every month, and over 2 million credit reports are issued every day. 
Real-time access to credit bureau information has reduced the time required to approve a 
loan from a few weeks to just a few minutes.  But credit bureaus have also been criticized 
for furnishing erroneous information and for compromising privacy.  The result has been 
30 years of regulation at the state and federal levels. 
This paper describes how the consumer credit reporting industry evolved from a few joint 
ventures of local retailers around 1900 to a high technology industry that plays a 
supporting role in America’s trillion dollar consumer credit market.  In many ways the 
development of the industry reflects the intuition developed in the theoretical literature on 
information-sharing arrangements.  But the story is richer than the models.  Credit 
bureaus have changed as retail and lending markets changed, and the impressive gains in 
productivity at credit bureaus are the result of their substantial investments in technology.   
Credit bureaus obviously benefit when their data are more reliable, but should we expect 
them to attain the socially efficient degree of accuracy?  There are plausible reasons to 
think not, and this is the principal economic rationale for regulating the industry.  An 
examination of the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act reveals an attempt to 
attain an appropriate economic balancing of the benefits of a voluntary information-
sharing arrangement against the cost of any resulting mistakes. 
 
JEL Codes:  D82, G21, G28, N22 
Keywords:   Consumer credit reporting, credit bureaus, information sharing, Fair Credit 
Reporting Act  
I.  Introduction 
Consumer credit bureaus are organizations that compile and disseminate reports on the 
creditworthiness of consumers.  Firms that lend to consumers provide the underlying data 
to the bureaus.  In the United States today, there is at least one credit bureau file, and 
probably three, for every credit-using individual in the country.  Over 2 billion items of 
information are added to these files every month, and over 2 million credit reports are 
issued every day.  In many instances, real-time access to credit bureau information has 
reduced the time required to approve a loan from a few weeks to just a few minutes. 
A consumer credit report typically includes four kinds of information.
1  First, 
there is identifying information such as the person’s name, current and previous 
addresses, social security number, date of birth, and current and previous employers.  
Next, there is a list of credit information that includes accounts at banks, retailers, and 
lenders.  The accounts are listed by type, the date opened, the credit limit or loan amount, 
outstanding balances, and the timeliness of payments on the account.  There may also be 
information gleaned from public records, including bankruptcy filings, tax liens, 
judgments, and possibly arrests or convictions.  The file will typically include a count of 
the number of inquiries authorized by the consumer but will not contain any information 
about applications for credit or insurance that were denied. 
Today Americans hold more than 1.4 billion credit cards, use them to spend $1 
trillion a year, and maintain balances in excess of $600 billion.
2  Information provided by 
credit bureaus is an important ingredient in the vast expansion of unsecured consumer 
credit in the U.S. over the last century.  This information is used to decide who is offered 
credit and on what terms.  Credit bureau data are used to monitor fraud.  The existence of 
credit bureaus is an inducement to honor one’s debts.  Information shared through credit 
bureaus can increase competition among providers of financial services, resulting in more 
credit offered on better terms.   
But this does not mean that private credit bureaus necessarily maximize social 
welfare.  There are plausible reasons why credit bureaus may make more mistakes than 
would otherwise be efficient.  Nor would their choice of the relative frequency of 
mistakes (including inaccurate derogatory information vs. excluding positive 
information) necessarily be efficient.  In the U.S., credit bureaus have a tarnished 
reputation and are subject to regulation at the federal and state levels.  The regulatory 
regime adopted in the U.S. was clearly shaped by an attempt to balance the social 
                                                 
1 This paper focuses on what the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) calls consumer reports and 
not investigative consumer reports.  The latter are sometimes used for employment, insurance, and other 
decisions, are based in part on information gathered from personal interviews, and are governed differently 
under the FCRA.  Investigative reports engendered significant controversy in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, in part because consumers were not always informed they were being done or that information 
based on them was maintained in credit bureau files.  See Miller (1971) and the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission (1977).   
2 These numbers, for 1999, are from HSN Consultants and The Nilson Report, as reprinted in the 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S: 2001.  
benefits and costs of information sharing.  Whether that balance can be improved upon is 
the subject of ongoing debate.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the 
relevant literature on voluntary information-sharing arrangements.  Section III describes 
how consumer credit reporting evolved in the U.S. over the last century in response to 
legal, economic, and technological changes.  Section IV examines the most commonly 
articulated rationale for regulation of the industry—inadequate precaution with respect to 
consumer privacy and the accuracy of data contained in credit files.  Section V reviews 
the American scheme for regulating the industry.  Section VI concludes by examining 
two of the leading challenges facing the industry in the U.S.—the possibility of more 
stringent regulation and ongoing consolidation in the credit card industry.    
II. The Economics of Information Sharing 
Adverse selection is an important problem in the market for unsecured credit in the U.S.  
Ausubel (1999) found that individuals who responded to a given credit card solicitation 
were, on average, worse credit risks than those who did not respond.  Also, customer 
pools resulting from credit card solicitations offering inferior terms (e.g., higher interest 
rates) had a higher average risk of default than pools resulting from solicitations offering 
better terms.
3   
Ausubel’s earlier finding that credit card rates in the U.S. are sticky—i.e., they do 
not change very much in response to a change in banks’ cost of funds—can be interpreted 
as another indicator of adverse selection (Ausubel 1991).  If lenders respond through 
credit rationing, marginal increases in the supply of loanable funds would not reduce 
interest rates until the excess demand is entirely eliminated (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
4 
The significance of moral hazard in credit card markets is, of course, a central 
topic in the ongoing debate over bankruptcy reform in the United States.  Throughout 
2001-02, credit card delinquency and charge-off rates, as well as the consumer 
bankruptcy rate, were at or near record highs.  Empirical research suggests that many 
factors contribute to bankruptcy filings (Sullivan et al. 2000), and some economists 
wonder why Americans do not file more than they do (White 1998).
5    
Credit bureaus mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems by 
providing timely information about the characteristics and behavior of potential 
borrowers.  Because that information is retained for a considerable time (seven years for 
most derogatory credit information in the U.S.), credit bureaus enable the maintenance of 
reputation effects in a market consisting of millions of otherwise anonymous borrowers 
                                                 
3 Additional empirical evidence is found in Calem and Mester (1995). 
4 Adverse selection can lead to sticky prices through mechanisms other than credit rationing.  For 
example, Mester (1994) describes how reductions in banks’ costs of funds may result in an increase in the 
average riskiness of credit card borrowers. 
5 For reviews of the recent literature, see Congressional Budget Office (2000) and Mester (2002).  
The latter article contains a plain English description of the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation.  
  4 
(Klein 1997).  In the U.S. at least, credit bureau data can be used to generate lists of 
consumers who are offered pre-approved lines of credit (pre-screening).  The availability 
of data on a universe of credit users also makes it possible to develop sophisticated 
models to select and price credit risk for unsecured consumer loans. 
A.  Intuition from Economic Theory   
Given the evident benefits to lenders, it seems natural to expect information sharing to 
emerge as soon as an efficient mechanism for coordinating this process, the credit bureau, 
was developed.  In the U.S. and certain other countries that is exactly what happened.  
But credit bureaus do not always emerge, and in some instances, they were instead 
legislated into existence.  What explains the emergence of credit bureaus or their failure 
to emerge? 
1.  The Severity of the Information Problem 
The benefit to a lender of joining a credit bureau depends in part on the unobserved 
heterogeneity of its potential customers.  Information sharing becomes more attractive 
when good customers are harder to find, which diverts resources toward finding good 
customers rather than serving them.  In that case, it becomes relatively more efficient to 
pool information than for each firm to generate it (Wilson 1990). 
The incentive to join a credit bureau will depend on how frequently lenders 
expect to encounter new potential borrowers and the nature of competition among 
lenders.  The number of new potential borrowers should clearly depend on the geographic 
mobility of consumers and possibly the geographic reach of a lender’s operations.  As for 
competition, consider two possible lending environments—one in which consumers do 
all their borrowing from a single lender and one where borrowers are able to obtain loans 
from many different lenders.  In the latter case, lenders would clearly be willing to incur 
some expense in order to obtain a better idea of a borrower’s total indebtedness, both 
before and after making a loan. 
2.  Costs 
Another obvious factor is the cost associated with establishing and maintaining a credit 
bureau.  These costs may be prohibitive if the fixed costs are high and relatively little 
lending is going on.  But these costs become easier to absorb when lenders are making a 
higher volume of loans.  The volume of consumer lending also affects the information 
advantage that a credit bureau enjoys over the information held by any given lender.    
Another reason that the volume of lending matters is that when there is a high 
volume of applications for loans of modest size, relative to business loans, for example, 
lenders cannot afford to invest a lot of resources evaluating each loan application.  Once 
established, a credit bureau can help lenders to substitute more costly screening 
techniques (credit scoring) with timely credit history information without incurring an 
unacceptable increase in overall credit risk.  These techniques need not depend on the 
information contained in one lender’s files.  Rather, they are often refined and calibrated 
using credit history information gathered from all participating lenders (e.g., FICO 
scores).     
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3.  Network Effects 
There is clearly an element of network effects with credit bureaus.  Obviously, credit 
bureaus become more useful to lenders as the coverage of potential customers increases.  
A credit bureau with better coverage of lenders is more highly valued because any lender 
that relies on the bureau’s data can be more confident it knows the totality of a 
borrower’s credit activity.  Both of these mechanisms can mitigate adverse selection.  
They may also reduce moral hazard if borrowers are aware that their credit lines and 
payment history are reported by, and can be disclosed to, a larger share of potential 
creditors.  Finally, additional membership helps to amortize a bureau’s fixed costs.   
These factors suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria.  Without some form of 
coordination, a credit bureau may not attain a sufficient scale to be self-sustaining.  But if 
a sufficient scale is reached, bandwagon effects might easily lead to universal 
membership.  In that case, when we observe credit bureaus we would expect to observe 
only a few of them, perhaps only one, serving a particular market.   
But network effects may not be so strong as to imply universal participation by 
creditors or a monopoly credit bureau.  For example, there may be a point where 
increases in credit bureau membership yields relatively little new information but creates 
more competition for a relatively fixed pool of borrowers (Wilson 1990).  Alternatively, a 
lender that is more worried about moral hazard than adverse selection may be tempted 
not to join the credit bureau, essentially free-riding on the deterrent effect created by the 
information sharing of its fellow lenders.  This is less likely as the cost of participating in 
a credit bureau falls.  Finally, creditors may choose to share information with more than 
one bureau in order to stimulate competition and innovation for such services. 
4.  Market Structure 
Suppose for the moment that we can treat market structure and the intensity of bank 
competition separately.  In a more concentrated lending market bank, a given bank will 
have information about a larger share of the universe of borrowers than would a bank in a 
less concentrated market (Marquez 2001).  That suggests credit bureaus may enjoy a 
larger informational advantage over individual banks when lending is less concentrated.   
Two additional arguments can be made.  First, when there are many lenders, they 
are likely to be more concerned about the current indebtedness of any prospective 
borrower.  To the extent that subsequent indebtedness may reduce the likelihood that 
existing loans will be repaid, lenders will also be concerned about any additional 
borrowing done by their existing customers.
6  That suggests we should expect credit 
bureaus to emerge more often when there are more lenders, each of whom accounts for a 
smaller share of the borrowing population. 
                                                 
6 Shaffer (1998) posits an another argument that is relevant here—the winner’s curse associated 
with being the lender who grants a loan to a borrower previously rejected by many other banks.   
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5.  Competition 
Now we turn to the question of competition among lenders.  A number of papers (Wilson 
1990, Pagano and Jappelli 1993) suggest that more competition reduces the likelihood 
that lenders will join a credit bureau because doing so reduces the information asymmetry 
between a borrower’s current lender and its competitors.  The question is whether a bank 
can earn enough profits on customers it attracts from other lenders to offset the decline in 
profits that results from having to offer more competitive terms to its existing customers.  
If the only barrier to competition is the lack of information on rivals’ customers, 
establishing a credit bureau might reduce profits.  In that case it is less likely that 
information sharing would be voluntarily adopted by the industry.  
Padilla and Pagano (1997) suggest another possible inducement to the formation 
of credit bureaus.  If banks can extract significant rents from borrowers and cannot 
commit to avoid this, borrowers may have too little incentive to avoid default.  In this 
environment, disclosing information about one’s borrowers is a way to commit not to 
extract too much rent.  Banks will agree to share information if they gain more by 
reducing the default rate than they lose in profits on loans that would otherwise be repaid.   
But information sharing need not be a discrete choice.  It is possible these 
tradeoffs could result in an equilibrium where some, but not all, information about 
customers is shared.  For example, lenders might share only negative information about 
their customers—delinquencies and defaults—but not positive credit information such as 
the size of a credit line, its utilization, or other information relevant to a customer’s 
ability to repay.  It’s possible that by sharing some information, lenders could benefit 
from a reduction in adverse selection without losing too much profit.      
A number of papers show that disclosing limited information may be superior to 
disclosing all available information about borrowers.  In Padilla and Pagano (2000) there 
is a tradeoff between the benefits of reducing adverse selection via full disclosure and 
reducing moral hazard by limiting disclosure, which induces borrowers to signal their 
type by avoiding defaults.  The result is more lending, at lower interest rates, and with 
less frequent defaults than a policy of sharing all available information.  In Vercammen 
(1995), a similar intuition can be used to justify limiting the length of borrowers’ credit 
history, a practice regularly observed in the credit reporting industry.
7  
B.  Credit Bureaus in the Real World 
How well do the preceding theoretical arguments explain what we observe about credit 
bureaus in the U.S. and abroad?  The answer is that, even with the relatively limited 
empirical evidence available, the theory seems to explain a lot.  Credit bureaus tend to 
emerge in countries where people are relatively mobile and, to a lesser extent, where the 
ratio of consumer borrowing to consumption is higher (Pagano and Jappelli 1993).  The 
relationship between these variables and the annual per capita volume of consumer credit 
reports is even stronger.   
                                                 
7 Such limitations are usually imposed by law and typically apply only to derogatory credit 
information.    
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In most developed countries, only a handful of credit bureaus are responsible for 
generating the vast majority of credit reports, and at least one of those bureaus will enjoy 
nearly complete coverage of consumers who borrow money (Jappelli and Pagano 1999).  
It appears that credit bureaus are more likely to emerge as a joint venture of local retailers 
or lenders than they are from collaborations of firms with a national reach (Pagano and 
Jappelli 1993).  But once a credit bureau is created, its scope tends to grow with the scope 
of its members (see section II).  In addition, bureaus that evolved in this way tend to 
share more positive credit information than bureaus initially established to serve lenders 
with a national reach. 
In several developed countries, the sharing of consumer credit information did not 
exist until it was mandated by law.  In these countries, the volume of consumer credit 
tended to be smaller, and there were fewer regulatory restrictions limiting competition 
between lenders (Pagano and Jappelli 1993).  These patterns are consistent with the 
argument that voluntary information sharing is more difficult to initiate when doing so 
might contribute to intense competition among lenders, but that once established, credit 
bureaus enjoy significant network effects. 
Can we quantify the benefits that consumer credit bureaus provide?  A lower 
bound of the gross benefits should be reflected in the revenues earned by credit bureaus 
and firms such as Fair, Isaac and Co., which develop scorecards for consumer loans.  For 
the U.S., this lower bound is at least several billion dollars (see section II).  McCorkell 
(2002) argues that using scorecards built with data supplied by credit bureaus results in 
delinquency rates 20-30 percent lower than lending decisions based solely on judgmental 
evaluation of applications for credit.  Conversely, holding the expected default rate 
constant, using scorecards yields a comparable increase in the acceptance rate.
8   
If we suppose for the moment that this technology disappeared and that lenders 
did not adjust the volume of their credit card lending, a simple estimate of the resulting 
increase in loan losses for the U.S. would be about $5 billion a year.  Conversely, 
suppose that lenders responded to the loss of this technology by trying to hold the 
delinquency rate constant.  The resulting decline in outstanding revolving loans would be 
about $120 billion.
9  These obviously crude calculations bound a region of potential 
gains, as banks would obviously adjust to any change in their screening technology. 
III. The Evolution of the American Consumer Credit Reporting Industry 
Consumer credit bureaus emerged in the United States in the late 19
th century.  Other 
early adopters include Austria, Sweden, Finland, South Africa, Canada, Germany, and 
                                                 
8 See also Chandler and Parker (1989) and Chandler and Johnson (1992).  
9 This number is 20 percent of the product of the charge-off rate on banks’ credit card loans (4.38 
percent) times outstanding revolving credit ($613 billion) in the first quarter of 2000.  That was the recent 
low for delinquencies and chargeoffs on U.S. banks’ credit card loans.  The delinquency and charge-off 
rates were nearly identical at the time. See Barron and Staten (2001) for a comparable exercise in which 
they ask what would be the decline in the discriminatory power of a scorecard when it is constructed only 
with derogatory credit information.  Jappelli and Pagano (1999) use a cross national sample with 
macroeconomic data to identify some preliminary evidence of the effect of credit bureaus on default rates. 
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Australia (Jappelli and Pagano 1999).  In the U.S., most of the early credit bureaus were 
cooperatives or nonprofit ventures set up by local merchants to pool the credit histories of 
their customers and to assist in collections activities.  Others were established by local 
finance companies or the local chamber of commerce (Cole and Mishler 1998).   
The next step for this industry was the formation of a mechanism to share 
consumer credit information in different cities and regions of the country.  This was 
accomplished through a trade association established in 1906.  For most of its existence 
this organization was known as Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., or ACB.
10  ACB 
developed the procedures, formats, and definitions that enabled the sharing of credit files 
between agencies across the country.  ACB even introduced a form of scrip, which 
members purchased from the association, which was used as a currency to pay for credit 
reports obtained from fellow members in other cities.   
Membership in ACB grew rapidly from fewer than 100 bureaus in 1916 to 800 in 
1927, and doubling again by 1955.  According to ACB, its members collectively attained 
universal coverage of consumer borrowers by 1960.  But even in that year, the largest of 
the credit bureaus maintained files on consumers in at most a handful of cities.  At a time 
when the technology was limited to filing cabinets, the postage meter, and the telephone, 
American credit bureaus issued 60 million credit reports in a single year. 
A.  Credit Bureaus Respond to Economic and Technological Change 
Credit bureaus emerged at a time when the primary source of consumer credit was 
offered by retailers; the other important sources were pawnbrokers, small loan 
companies, and, of course, friends and family.  One reason that retailers were so 
dominant in this period was that state usury laws made it difficult to earn profits on small 
loans lent at legal rates (Caldor 1999, Gelpi and Julien-Labruyere 2000).   
Retailers, on the other hand, were able to earn a profit because they simply 
charged more for goods purchased on credit.
  This advantage became less important after 
1916 when many states relaxed their usury laws.  Even so, in 1929 retailers financed one-
third of all retail sales.  Among retailers who offered credit, credit sales accounted for a 
little more than half of their sales.
11   
The share of retail sales carried on open accounts—a form of revolving credit—
ranged from 20-22 percent in the business censuses conducted from 1929 to 1948.  In 
1935, open account sales represented 21 percent of sales at food stores, 19 percent at 
clothing stores, 26 percent at department stores, 24 percent at furniture stores, 22 percent 
at gas stations, and 52 percent at fuel and ice dealers.  But the share of sales accounted for 
                                                 
10 This association was originally called the National Federation of Retail Credit Agencies.  Today 
it is called the Consumer Data Industry Association, or CDIA, but I will refer to its historic name 
throughout this paper.  Some of the information presented in this section is drawn from the organization’s 
web site. 
11 These numbers exclude credit arranged through separate finance companies.  For details on the 
historical statistics cited in this section, see the Data Appendix. 
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by installment contracts financed by retailers declined from 13 percent in 1929 to less 
than 6 percent in 1948, as finance companies and banks took up more of that business. 
Over the course of the last century, credit bureaus benefited from the increasing 
importance of consumer credit in the economy, but they also had to adapt to changes in 
the market for consumer credit.  In the half-century beginning in 1919, consumer credit 
grew four times more rapidly than did total consumer spending.  But consumer credit 
held by retailers grew only as rapidly as consumer spending.  As a result, the share of 
consumer credit held by retailers fell by half (from 80 percent to 40 percent) between 
1919 and 1941.  By 1965, it had fallen by nearly half again (Figures 1 and 2).
12  In 2000, 
nonfinancial businesses held only 5 percent of outstanding consumer credit.  Thus, the 
rapid growth in consumer debt over this period did not wind up on the books of retailers, 
but rather on the balance sheets of financial institutions—primarily banks and finance 
companies.   
Another significant change in this period was that retail and consumer credit 
markets got bigger.  At the turn of the century, for all but a handful of retailers and 
catalogue sellers, the market was limited to a single city or just part of a city.  But this 
gradually changed.  For example, regional or national department store chains accounted 
for less than 15 percent of department store sales in 1929.  By 1972, they accounted for 
nearly 80 percent of sales.  If we examine retail sales as a whole, which includes the sales 
of tens of thousands of independent restaurants and gasoline stations, the share of sales 
by regional or national chains rose from 13 percent in 1929 to 31 percent in 1972 (Figure 
3).  Over time, larger chains removed their credit operations from individual stores and 
consolidated them at the headquarters.  Membership and information sharing at the local 
credit bureau became less important while cooperation with the larger and more 
comprehensive credit bureaus became more important. 
For a long time, banks’ geographic expansion was constrained by restrictive 
branching laws.  For consumer credit, however, branching restrictions became less 
important once bank-issued credit cards were introduced in the late 1950s and widely 
adopted in the late 1960s (Nocera 1994, Evans and Schmalensee 1999).  Eventually, 
among the banks with the largest number of credit card accounts, the vast majority of 
these customers were not served through their traditional branch operations.  
Once credit cards offered by banks were widely adopted, many retailers opted to 
accept these cards while dropping their in-house credit programs.  Many retailers, 
especially smaller ones, had offered credit plans simply to compete with other retailers.  
Merchants paid a price for accepting the bankcards—the merchant discount (6 percent of 
the purchase price at that time)—but they avoided other expenses, such as bookkeeping 
and collections activity, to say nothing of the cost of financing these receivables 
themselves.  Larger retailers have maintained their store cards—even today there are 
more store card accounts than bankcard accounts, and the largest issuers include retailers 
such as Sears.  In other instances, retailers have sub-contracted their store card operations 
to financial firms and no longer carry the receivables on their own balance sheets.    
                                                 
12 To span the century, two sets of data are required.  See the Data Appendix for details.  
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These changes occurred rapidly after the late 1960s.  In 1968, the amount of 
revolving credit held by retailers was nearly six times higher than bankcard balances and 
outstanding check credit.  Ten years later (1978), banks and retailers held roughly equal 
amounts of revolving credit (Figure 4).  Another 15 years later (1993), revolving credit 
held at banks was more than three times higher than balances held by retailers.
13   
The rapid development of the credit card industry presented both opportunities 
and challenges to credit bureaus in the early 1970s.  On the one hand, card-issuing banks 
were a source of new business to credit bureaus.  “Pre-screening services”—the process 
in which a card issuer would specify a set of characteristics of potential borrowers used to 
generate a mailing list of people to whom the issuer extends firm offers of credit—
became a significant source of revenue to the industry.  On the other hand, lenders were 
interested in offering credit cards on a regional or national scale, which required access to 
credit files that no single bureau held in the late 1960s.  In addition, banks were rapidly 
automating their systems and soon expected to share and obtain data with credit bureaus 
through electronic rather than paper means.  To meet these changes, credit bureaus had to 
automate and they had to get larger.   
And that is exactly what happened.  The largest credit bureaus already enjoyed 
coverage of one or more large cities, and they soon began to expand their scope by 
acquiring credit bureaus in other cities.  ACB membership declined from a peak of 
around 2,200 in 1965 to only about 500 today.  After rising for decades, the number of 
credit bureau offices also began to decline, falling 20 percent between 1972 and 1997.   
Credit bureaus in the largest cities were automated first, beginning with Los 
Angeles in 1965, followed by New York and San Francisco in 1967.
14  Shortly thereafter, 
the largest bureaus established networks to access files in any of their automated bureaus 
across the country.   As member banks and retailers built up national credit franchises, 
their data made it possible for the largest bureaus to progress toward the goal of in-house 
universal coverage of borrowers.  The three largest credit bureaus (today they are called 
TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax) attained universal coverage in the 1980s.    
Most credit bureaus were simply too small to afford the high fixed cost of 
automating with the technology then available.  In 1975, two-thirds of ACB member 
bureaus were located in towns with populations of 20,000 or less.  As recently as 1989, 
more than a third of ACB member bureaus had not yet automated and relied upon an 
ACB service to obtain access to information provided by regional and national creditors.  
Nearly 500 independent credit bureaus had automated, but they relied on contracts with 
one or more of the top three bureaus to obtain information provided by larger creditors.    
                                                 
13 If we include securitized revolving credit—mostly issued by banks at the time, but not carried 
on their balance sheets—the ratio would be 5:1 rather than 3:1. 
14 In 1969 only four ACB member bureaus were partially or fully automated.  Six years later, 80 
member bureaus had automated. 
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B.  The Consumer Credit Reporting Industry Today 
In 1997, there were just under 1,000 active consumer credit reporting agencies in the 
U.S., employing about 22,000 people and generating $2.8 billion in sales.
15  Virtually all 
of these revenues are derived from charges for access to consumer credit reports.  
Controlling for inflation, industry revenues have quadrupled since 1972— twice the 
increase in the overall economy and the stock of consumer credit outstanding.  The 
number of credit reports issued today is 10 times higher than 30 years ago, yet industry 
employment is essentially unchanged.  Few industries can boast such impressive gains in 
labor productivity. 
The industry is segmented into small and big firms.  A typical credit bureau has 
just one office and employs 10 people.  Nine-tenths of all firms have annual sales of less 
than $2.5 million.  In 1997, only 14 companies had more than five offices.  Yet these 
firms accounted for more than a fifth of all offices, half of industry employment, and 
two-thirds of industry receipts.  The four largest firms alone account for over half of 
industry receipts.  These larger firms concentrate on high volume businesses—those 
firms seeking credit file information thousands or even millions of times a year.  They 
also conduct most of the pre-screening services that result in the billions of solicitations 
for credit cards or insurance delivered by mail each year.  Smaller firms, on the other 
hand, concentrate on low volume and one-time customers.  For these customers, the 
automated technology of the large bureaus has been too costly to justify for such a low 
volume.  But with cheap powerful PCs and Internet-based delivery, such costs are falling, 
and this may put additional pressure on the smaller independent bureaus. 
There are also a number of smaller, less well-known credit bureaus that serve 
particular niche markets.  Many personal finance companies participate in associations 
(called lenders’ exchanges) that maintain records of credit extended to an individual from 
members in the association.  There is a medical credit bureau that primarily serves 
doctors and dentists.  Another bureau (the Medical Information Bureau) pools certain 
health information of applicants for life insurance.  There are a number of highly 
automated credit bureaus that serve retailers that accept personal checks and banks that 
seek information on customers opening checking accounts (Telecredit, SCAN, and 
Chexsystems).  There are a variety of bureaus that serve landlords evaluating prospective 
tenants (Landlord Connections, for example), and there is even a bureau that serves 
telephone companies (the National Consumer Telecommunications Exchange).    
Outside the U.S., consumer credit bureaus are on the rise.  A recent World Bank 
survey found at least 25 new private bureaus were created in Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America during the 1990s (Miller 2000).  Quite a few public credit registries were also 
created, especially in Latin America.  The big American bureaus have begun to expand 
abroad.  Experian, now owned by a British firm, has concentrated on Europe, while 
Equifax has acquired a number of bureaus in Latin America. 
                                                 
15 These statistics are from the Census of Service Industries.  See the Data Appendix for details. 
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IV. Credit Bureaus as Black Sheep 
The American consumer credit reporting industry has a poor reputation in the eyes of 
many consumers.  To some degree, credit bureaus are victims of their own success.  Few 
people stop to think about the role a credit bureau played in their successfully obtaining 
credit, insurance, or even employment.  But when they are denied such things on the 
basis of information contained in a credit report, the credit bureau often gets the blame. 
Consumers are also concerned about the potential loss of privacy that may result from the 
sharing of sensitive financial information.  Credit bureaus are concerned about these 
issues too, but it’s unlikely they weigh the benefits and costs of greater accuracy, or 
greater privacy, in the same way most consumers do.  It is not surprising, then, that these 
two concerns have been addressed through regulation. 
A.  The Quality of Credit Bureau Information 
Credit bureaus obtain account history data from member institutions, sort and aggregate 
these data into personal credit histories, and disseminate this information to members at 
their request.  The benefit to members from sharing this information clearly depends on 
its accuracy and timeliness.  But members also share in the cost of providing information 
to the bureau.  The more costly it is to provide this information, the less attractive it will 
be for a lender to join a bureau.   
1.  Economic Intuition 
The level of quality maintained by credit bureaus will depend on a balancing of the costs 
and benefits to their member institutions.  This depends, in turn, on the relative costs of 
making and correcting mistakes.  Naturally, lenders wish to minimize the cost of 
processing and transmitting the information they are obliged to provide to credit bureaus.
  
                                                
This is not to say that lenders do not care about the quality of this information—after all, 
the data are typically a direct output of their own internal information systems.   
When using credit bureau data, lenders are concerned about two types of errors: A 
type I error grants credit to a person based on erroneous information; a type II error 
denies credit to a person based on erroneous information.  For lenders, the expected loss 
associated with a type I error (the principal lost) is likely to be higher than the expected 
loss from a type II error (forgone profits on a loan).  So given that lenders are both the 
providers and beneficiaries of credit history information, one might expect that credit 
bureau files are more likely to contain erroneous references to delinquencies or defaults 
than they are to mistakenly omit actual delinquencies or defaults.  To borrowers, of 
course, the cost of not being able to obtain a loan could well be higher than the cost to a 
lender of not being able to make a loan to that person.  To the extent that borrowers' 
losses are not fully reflected in bureaus’ decision-making, there could be too many errors 
and, in particular, too many type II errors. 
When potential borrowers become aware of erroneous information in their credit 
reports, they will have an incentive to dispute it if they can.
16  In fact, borrowers enjoy a 
 
16 I assume, as current law requires in the U.S., that the borrower would not confront the problem 
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comparative advantage in identifying such errors.  One way to improve the accuracy of 
credit reports is to encourage consumers to dispute errors in their reports, setting in 
motion a process for rechecking the source and accuracy of the data reported.  Given 
there is a mutual interest in improving the accuracy of the data, it is not surprising to find 
that credit bureaus encourage consumers to correct errors in their files and devote 
considerable resources (customer service staffing, fee waivers, etc.) to the process.
17  In a 
cross-country survey, Miller (2000) found that 25 of 43 private bureaus offered free 
credit reports to consumers as a means of correcting errors.  Less than half reported using 
statistical or modeling techniques to identify errors. 
Both consumers and lenders share the benefits of any reduction in type II errors 
that result from an efficient dispute process.  Of course, they also share in the costs of 
that process.  But it is likely that consumers enjoy relatively more of the benefits while 
lenders bear relatively more of the cost of administering the dispute resolution process.  
As a result, from the standpoint of society, credit bureaus may devote too few resources 
to the error correction process.
18  What’s more, there may be disputes over the extent of 
proof required in order to reject a consumer’s dispute, how rapidly the dispute must be 
resolved, etc.  These issues suggest a possible role for government regulation. 
2.  Data on the Accuracy of Credit Bureau Files 
Perhaps no issue about this industry generates more heated debate than the accuracy of 
credit reports.  For all of this heat, relatively little data are available.  But we do know 
that the volume of activity in this industry is so large that even a small error rate would 
result in millions of inaccuracies each year.   
In 1989, ACB presented some aggregate statistics about its members.  In that 
year, consumers requested some 9 million credit reports, which is about 2 percent of the 
450 million reports generated annually at that time.  Consumers disputed about 3 million 
of those reports.  About 2 million credit reports were altered in the reverification process.  
Consumers disputed something in their reports about one-third of the time after they saw 
them, and about two-thirds of disputed reports were changed in the reverification process.  
But not all these changes were the result of an error in the report.  Some were the result of 
the routine updating of files with the most current information.
19 
Sometimes a credit report will include references to other people and their 
accounts.  These errors occur because creditors do not report information on individuals 
                                                                                                                                                 
of having to dispute an erroneous reference at every credit bureau, nor would the borrower have to deal 
with the re-appearance of an erroneous reference.   
17 Prior to the passage of the FCRA, some credit bureaus in the U.S. were less receptive to the idea 
of encouraging consumers to investigate their files.  Some bureaus actively discouraged lenders from 
disclosing to consumers the name of the bureau or even that a credit report had been obtained. 
18 This problem is aggravated if some consumers use the dispute process strategically, i.e., by 
disputing accurate derogatory information in the hope it will be erroneously removed.  In the U.S. this 
phenomenon has become sufficiently widespread to coin a phrase—the credit repair industry. 
19 At that time, credit bureau files were updated with 2 billion items of information each month. 
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so much as they do on accounts.  The credit bureau assembles a report on an individual 
by linking the accounts with the same names, addresses, birthdays, social security 
numbers, and other information that is presumably unique to the individual.  But this is 
not a simple exercise in a country with many thousands of lenders and where consumers 
move frequently and are also ambivalent about adopting a universal, unique ID number. 
Credit bureaus have developed sophisticated processes to aggregate account 
information into borrower profiles, but they are not perfect.  In an older study Williams 
(1989) was able to identify errors of this sort in credit reports a little over 10 percent of 
the time.
20  Such errors are not always innocuous: if the erroneous information includes 
someone else’s delinquencies, for example, a person’s credit rating will be adversely 
affected.  Even if the erroneous accounts are in good standing, they make it appear that 
the applicant has more open credit lines than he or she actually does.  Sometimes these 
mistakes can affect credit decisions.  But how often?      
In the early 1990s, ACB released summary statistics from a study based on a 
sample of nearly 16,000 applicants, all of whom were denied credit (Connelly 1992).  
Relatively few people requested a copy of their credit report, but a quarter of those who 
did disputed something in their report.  In about 14 percent of the disputed reports, the 
resulting changes were significant enough to reverse the credit decision.  In the study, 
there were only 36 such instances (0.2 percent of the sample).  A simple extrapolation, 
based on the previously cited statistics provided by ACB, suggests that in the early 1990s, 
the number of applications for credit mistakenly denied could have been large — in the 
tens if not hundreds of thousands each year.
21 
B.  Privacy 
Credit bureaus are information-sharing arrangements that help to reduce the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard in credit, insurance, and other markets.  The flip side 
of information sharing is necessarily a loss of consumer privacy.  It is likely that sharing 
a little information about borrowers, such as their payment history, generates benefits that 
exceed the losses associated with any loss of privacy, especially if consumers are aware 
that such information is being shared and access to the information is limited.  When 
access is less well regulated, consumers are less well informed, or information is used for 
purposes not envisioned by consumers, this case becomes harder to make. 
The American credit reporting industry has been embarrassed on several 
occasions by the ease with which people have obtained credit reports when they should 
                                                 
20 Less scientific reports produced by Consumers Union (in Michelle Meier’s 1991 testimony) and 
the Public Interest Research Group (Golinger and Mierzwinski 1998) found significantly higher error rates.  
See the Data Appendix. 
21  13.5 percent of 3 million disputed reports is 405,000.  But that number is likely an over-
estimate for two reasons.  First, the frequency of the most egregious mistakes is almost certainly higher in a 
sample of consumers denied credit than for the population as a whole (we don’t know how serious the 
selection problem was because the study, prepared by Arthur Andersen, was never published).  Second, not 
all of the 3 million reports disputed in 1989 occurred after a denial of credit.  So the 405,000 number is 
probably too high.  The question is, by how much? 
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not have.  In one study, about a third of the bureaus contacted were willing to provide 
credit reports without complying with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(Green 1991).  In 1989, Dan Quayle’s credit report was obtained by a reporter under the 
pretext of making a job offer to the vice president.  Certainly some deception was 
required in order to obtain the reports.
22  But it does seem that, at least at the time, a little 
deception went a long way.  
Direct access to the files of the largest credit bureaus is relatively difficult to 
obtain.  These companies operate automated systems that serve high volume customers.  
Their size makes it possible for them to afford elaborate and expensive security 
arrangements for their systems.  Their customers are primarily lenders who regularly 
provide information on their customers in addition to being frequent users of information 
contained in credit bureau reports.  It is relatively easy to police this stable customer base. 
At many of the smaller bureaus, the clientele consists of infrequent or one-time 
users of credit reports.  These users are less likely to be providers of credit information to 
the bureau.  Some of these bureaus are really just resellers of credit information compiled 
by one or more of the large bureaus.  Those bureaus may have a more difficult time 
policing their customers and may not have an adequate incentive to do so. 
On the other hand, it is the larger bureaus that are more likely to market 
information products that have little or nothing to do with applications for credit, 
insurance, or even employment.  For example, the largest bureaus offer databases that 
make it possible to match a person’s name or other identifying information to an address 
or phone number (individual reference services).  They also prepare targeted mailing lists 
of potential customers for nonfinancial products based on a set of characteristics specified 
by the list buyer, for example, a catalogue company.  Credit bureaus are not the only 
firms offering these services, but they are the most controversial.  At a minimum, such 
activities create at least the impression that a person’s personal information and payment 
history are being used for purposes completely unrelated to evaluating an application for 
credit. 
V.  The Regulation of Consumer Credit Bureaus 
The primary mechanism for regulating the activities of consumer credit bureaus in the 
U.S. is the Fair Credit Reporting Act (hereafter FCRA).
23  It was enacted in 1970 and 
amended several times since, most notably in 1996.  The FCRA creates obligations for 
credit bureaus, users of credit reports, and organizations that provide information to credit 
bureaus.  The principal agency responsible for enforcing the FCRA is the Federal Trade 
                                                 
22 The reporter was writing an article on credit bureaus for Business Week, published by McGraw-
Hill.  In 1998 McGraw-Hill was ordered to pay $7,500 in damages, resulting from a deliberate breach of 
contract, to the credit bureau that provided the information. 
23 15 U.S.C §§ 1681-1681(u).  A summary of the major provisions is found in Appendix A.  See 
also Hunt (2002) and the Federal Trade Commission’s web site www.ftc.gov. 
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Commission (FTC), but other federal agencies (including the Federal Reserve Board) are 
also responsible for enforcing the act among firms they regulate.
24    
In many ways, this law is an attempt to refine the balance between the obvious 
benefits credit bureaus generate and consumers’ legitimate concerns over accuracy and 
privacy.  The FCRA creates obligations for credit bureaus, users of credit reports, and 
credit bureau members.  The duties of lenders and other information providers are 
relatively modest — to avoid furnishing information known to be erroneous and to 
participate in the process of correcting errors identified by consumers.  This increases the 
quality of information provided to credit bureaus without significantly raising the cost of 
sharing the information.  Regulation should not raise these costs to the point where 
information providers drop out, a situation that would undermine a voluntary mechanism 
for sharing information. 
Similarly, inaccuracies in credit files do not violate the FCRA.  Rather, the act 
requires bureaus to use reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy.  
This standard is satisfied if the bureau adopts procedures a reasonably prudent person 
would use under the circumstances.  These procedures, in turn, depend on a balancing of 
the incremental benefits and costs of attaining higher levels of accuracy.
25  This balancing 
of benefits and costs may change over time as advances in technology make it easier for 
bureaus to adopt ever more powerful computers and software.   
The FCRA also encourages consumers to correct errors in their reports.  The cost 
to consumers of obtaining their own reports is limited by regulation.  The cost is free 
whenever information contained in a credit report has contributed to an adverse decision 
affecting the consumer — precisely the circumstance in which an error may be more 
costly.  The FCRA requires users of credit bureau information to remind consumers of 
their right to obtain and, if necessary, correct their credit reports.  The act sets a time limit 
for reinvestigations to be completed, at no cost to the consumer, and includes a number of 
mechanisms for ensuring that any corrections are disseminated to other credit bureaus 
and users of the report in question.   
This is not to say that the FCRA has attained the ideal balancing of benefits and 
costs that might be achieved.  Consumer groups remain concerned about the problems of 
accuracy and privacy and, in some areas, question whether the act is adequate (Golinger 
and Mierzwinski 1998).
26  Numerous congressional hearings in the late 1980s and early 
1990s culminated in amendments, enacted in 1996, that significantly strengthened 
consumer protections.  Thereafter, the FTC sued a number of credit bureaus, alleging 
they were devoting inadequate resources to the consumer-dispute process.
27  At the same 
                                                 
24 Under the act, state attorneys general may sue on behalf of their residents.  In addition, certain 
state laws provide consumers with additional rights.  
25  These interpretations are found in the 1982 case Bryant v. TRW, Inc. and the 1989 case Houston 
v. TRW Information Services, Inc. 
26 See also Edmund Mierzwinski’s 2001 testimony. 
27  In January 2000, the FTC announced a settlement, involving the three largest credit bureaus, 
that requires them to adequately staff the toll-free lines used by consumers seeking information about their 
credit reports. 
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time, continued improvements in computer and communications technology have 
reduced the cost of investigating alleged errors and correcting them when found.
28   
VI.  What Lies Ahead? 
In the U.S., the two-tier industry structure — a few giant credit bureaus with national 
coverage serving high-volume customers and many smaller bureaus serving specific 
niches or reselling data to low-volume customers — is likely to mature while adapting to 
new forms of delivery, for example, the Internet.  Advances in predictive modeling such 
as credit scoring will likely increase the value of information contained in credit bureau 
files.  But the industry also faces new challenges from governments as well as their own 
customers. 
A.  Challenges from Governments   
The industry faces the prospect of more intense scrutiny and possibly regulation.  In 2001 
the FTC succeeded in restricting the use of certain data in consumer credit reports to 
generate target-marketing lists used to sell nonfinancial products to consumers.  The FTC 
also succeeded in applying the financial privacy requirements of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act to credit bureaus’ “look-up” services, whereby a person’s name and other 
identifying information are matched with a current address or phone number contained in 
credit files.
29  And while the 1996 amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act limited 
the ability of states to enact new, more restrictive legislation affecting credit bureaus, 
those limits expire in 2004.  Credit bureaus may also be affected by the European Privacy 
Directive, which is generally more restrictive than U.S. law (Cate 1997). 
B.  Challenges from Lenders  
For a brief period in the late 1990s, lenders accounting for one-half of all consumer credit 
ceased reporting certain information (credit limits and high balances) on at least some of 
their credit card accounts (Fickensher 1999a and 1999b, Lazarony 2000).  Financial 
regulators warned lenders their underwriting systems might be compromised by 
incomplete credit bureau information (FFIEC 2000).  The leading credit bureaus 
responded by announcing they would limit access to their databases for lenders providing 
incomplete credit histories.  Thereafter, these lenders began to send more complete credit 
information to the bureaus.  
This behavior might be a reaction to a period of relatively intense competition for 
new customers by credit card lenders.  During this period, an increasing share of 
consumers’ unsecured debt was held on the books of a few lenders.  In just five years 
                                                 
28 The industry argues that any benefit from the reduction in the unit cost of resolving consumer 
disputes is being offset by rapid growth in the number of reports being disputed.  A conservative estimate 
of the industry-wide cost of labor devoted to resolving consumer disputes and instances of identity theft 
would easily exceed $10 million. 
29  See TransUnion Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission and Individual Reference Services Group, 
Inc. (IRSG), v. Federal Trade Commission et al. 
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(1996-2000), the share of bank credit card balances held by only 10 institutions increased 
from 43 percent to 63 percent (Figure 5).
30  These banks are the principal source of 
information about consumers’ payment habits for bankcards, as well as the principal 
source of potential new customers.  And during those five years, consumers were 
inundated with offers of credit card accounts that carried low introductory interest rates 
on balances transferred from other banks.  This episode is a reminder that, in the U.S. at 
least, information sharing among lenders is endogenous.  This equilibrium need not 
continue if there are significant changes in the economic or legal environment.    
                                                 
30 These statistics are based on Call Report data.  If we added back receivables securitized by these 
banks, the concentration ratios would likely be higher. 
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Sources:  Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Credit (G 19), and author’s calculations. See










1929 1939 1948 1954 1958 1963 1967 1972
All Department Stores
Grocery General Mdse.
Figure 3: Share of Retails Sales by Regional or National Chains
Sources: Census of Retail Trade and author’s calculations.  See Data Appendix for







1955 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Banks Retailers Securitized Pools
Figure 4: Revolving Credit ($ billions, log scale)
Sources:  Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Installment Credit (G 19), and






















No of Issuers (LHS) Mkt Share 10 largest (RHS)
Figure 5: Consolidation in the U.S. Credit Card Industry





  27Appendix A: An Overview of The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Appendix A: An Overview of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
 
Limitations on Disclosure of Credit Bureau Data 
Credit reports may be furnished only for purposes authorized in the act, for example, to 
lenders making a loan decision, insurers underwriting a policy, or employers considering 
a person for employment.  A credit report may be used in an employment decision but 
only with the potential employee's prior consent.  Medical information about a consumer 
cannot be shared with creditors, insurers, or employers without the consumer's consent.  
A credit report may also be issued to any person with a legitimate business need arising 
from a transaction initiated by the consumer or with an existing account with a consumer.  
An example might be a credit check performed by a prospective landlord. 
The FCRA was initially interpreted and later modified to explicitly permit a process 
called prescreening.  This is the process of generating lists of customers to be sent firm 
offers of credit or insurance, based on criteria specified by a lender or insurance 
company, without obtaining the prior consent of the consumers.  Consumers can call a 
single 800 number to opt out of prescreening services provided by the three national 
credit bureaus.     
Under the FCRA, credit bureaus must use reasonable procedures to prevent disclosures 
of consumers’ information that violate the act.  Users of credit bureau information must 
identify themselves and the reason why a credit report is being sought.  Credit bureaus 
must make a reasonable effort to verify this information when dealing with new 
customers.  When a consumer report is purchased for resale to an end-user, the identity of 
the end-user and the proposed use of that report must be provided to the credit bureau. 
The FCRA specifies penalties for violations of consumers’ privacy.  A credit bureau or a 
user of a credit report found to be in negligent noncompliance with the act is responsible 
for the consumer’s actual damages plus his or her reasonable legal expenses.  Punitive 
damages may be awarded in instances of willful noncompliance.  Officers or employees 
of a credit bureau who knowingly or willfully disclose consumer information to a person 
not authorized to receive it can be prosecuted.  Any person who obtains a consumer 
report under false pretenses is subject to criminal prosecution and can be sued by the 
credit bureau for actual damages. 
Accuracy of Credit Bureau Data 
Duties of Credit Bureaus.  Credit bureaus must use reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of the information contained in credit reports.  This standard 
is satisfied if the bureau adopts procedures like those a reasonably prudent person would 
use under the circumstances. 
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Credit reports may not include negative credit information that is more than seven years 
old or bankruptcies that are more than 10 years old.  Suits or unpaid judgments may not 
be included after seven years unless the relevant statute of limitations runs longer.
1 
Duties of Lenders and Other Information Providers.  A provider of information to a 
credit bureau may not be sued by a consumer for noncompliance with the FCRA unless it 
failed to review all the information provided to it by the credit bureau when 
reinvestigating a file at the request of the consumer. 
A lender may not furnish credit bureaus with information it knows, or consciously avoids 
knowing, is inaccurate.  If it regularly furnishes information to a credit bureau and 
discovers an inaccuracy, it must notify the bureau of the error and correct the 
information.  Lenders must notify credit bureaus of accounts that are voluntarily closed 
by a customer.  If a consumer has contacted the firm to dispute information it has 
provided to a credit bureau, the dispute must be noted when that information is 
subsequently reported to the credit bureau. 
Procedures for Dispute Resolution.  Anyone who makes an adverse decision—such as 
denying an application for credit, insurance, or employment—on the basis of information 
contained in a credit report must inform the consumer and provide the name, address, and 
phone number of the bureau that furnished the report.
2  The consumer must also be given 
a disclosure describing his or her rights under the FCRA.   
Consumers may obtain copies of their credit report at any time for a fee that is capped by 
regulation.  If a consumer experiences an adverse decision on the basis of information 
contained in a credit report, he or she is entitled to a free copy of the report.  Consumers 
must receive all the information in their file, including any medical information, and the 
sources of the underlying data must also be reported.
3  The consumer must also be given 
the identity of any person who procured his or her credit report in the last year, two years 
if the purpose was employment related. 
Consumers may dispute an item in their credit report simply by writing to the credit 
bureau and explaining why the information in question is inaccurate.  At a minimum, the 
bureau must forward this complaint to the provider of the information in question, which 
must then investigate the item.  The information provider must report back to the bureau, 
which in turn informs the consumer of the outcome of the investigation.  If the 
                                                 
1 These limitations do not apply in cases where a credit report is used for the purposes of an 
application for credit or life insurance exceeding $150,000 or for a position with a salary that exceeds 
$75,000.  Also there is no limitation on the reporting of criminal convictions. 
2 If the adverse decision pertains to an extension of credit but is based on information other than a 
credit report, the consumer has a right to request an explanation for this decision.  The creditor must 
respond to such a request within 60 days. 
3 But the FCRA does not require that credit bureaus include credit scores in their disclosure to 
consumers who request their reports. 
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information provider had previously sent the erroneous information to one of the national 
credit bureaus, it must also send the corrected information to them. 
If the result is a change in the credit report, the consumer receives a free copy of the 
revised report and may request that it be sent to anyone who recently obtained a copy of 
his or her report.  If the investigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may 
insert a brief statement about the item in his or her file. 
A credit bureau must remove or correct inaccurate information from its files within 30 
days after it is disputed.  The FCRA does not require credit bureaus to remove accurate 
data from a file unless it is either outdated or cannot be verified.  If a dispute results in a 
change in the credit report, the disputed information cannot be reinserted unless it is 
reverified by the information source and the consumer is given notice of the change in his 
or her file. 
Preemption of State Law 
The FCRA prohibits consumers from suing for defamation, invasion of privacy, or 
negligence (under state law) resulting from information that is contained in their credit 
report.  This prohibition applies to suits against credit bureaus, users of credit reports, and 
information providers.  This prohibition does not apply, however, where false 
information is furnished with malice or willful intent to injure a consumer. 
The 1996 amendments to the act prohibit states from enacting new legislation related to 
certain portions of the law until 2004.  The prohibition applies to new limits on the 
amount of time that derogatory information can be retained in credit reports, the amount 
of time allowed for credit bureaus to respond to a consumer dispute, additional duties of 
firms that provide information to credit bureaus, or new restrictions on the ability of 
credit bureaus to offer prescreening services to companies making firm offers of credit or 
insurance. 
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Consumer Credit Extended by Retailers and Financial Institutions 
The share of retail sales financed via retailer credit in 1929 is derived from the 1930 
Census of Business.  This calculation excludes paper, primarily automobile loans, 
financed or purchased by finance companies.  The shares of open account sales for 
various categories of stores in 1935 are from a reprint of the 1935 survey in the 1939 
Survey of Business. 
Calculations for the growth of consumer credit held by retailers and financial companies 
and the respective shares of consumer credit held by these categories are based on data 
contained in Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941-70.   
The shares of consumer credit for more recent years are derived from the Federal Reserve 
statistical release G.19 Consumer Installment Credit, published monthly.  The edition 
used, together with the most recent version of the historical series (found at the Board's 
web site), is from October 2001. 
It should be noted that survey coverage, categories of lenders (including retailers), and 
categories of loans vary depending on the vintage of data being used.  For example, 
consumer credit is sometimes divided into installment credit and other credit, but how 
that is done varies over time.  Also, a separate breakdown for retailers disappears in 
releases after the mid 1990s.  Thereafter, a breakdown for non-financial companies 
(mostly retailers) is reported.   
Comparisons of the growth rate of consumer credit relative to consumer spending rely on 
the most recent version of the National Income and Product Accounts for years after 
1928.  For the period 1919 to 1928, these calculations are based on series E 135 (CPI all 
items) and G 470 (personal consumption expenditures) in the Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1970. 
The statistics on revolving credit held by retailers and commercial banks (Figure 4) are 
based on a variety of tabulations published by the Federal Reserve System.  These 
include the Annual Statistical Digest (1970-79, 1980-89, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994), the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin (December 1968, October 1972, and December 1975), and 
revisions to the Consumer Installment Credit series published in April 1986 and May 
1993.  After 1970, banks’ revolving credit includes check credit.  Revolving credit at 
retailers includes gasoline stations.  Because of changes in reporting of the series, there is 
no consistent data for revolving credit at retailers for 1975.  The year-end number for 
1976 is derived from the January 1977 number for revolving credit at retailers, less the 
proportionate share of the increase in credit held by retailers. 
Shares of Retail Sales Accounted for by Regional and National Chains. 
For 1929, the shares are calculated using the Census Bureau’s categories of "sectional or 
national" chains as reported in the 1930 Census of Business.  Shares for later years are 
calculated using firms with 26 or more stores, as reported in the 1939 Census of Business 
and the Census of Retail Trade thereafter.  The 1939 census also reports data categorized 
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as sectional or national chains, and for most categories of retailers, these are comparable 
to the numbers reported for firms with 26 or more stores.   
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies 
Data on the number of offices, employment, receipts, and concentration ratios are from 
the Census of Service Industries as reported in 1972 and more recent editions.  The 
numbers for 1997 are for the industry code 5614501 in the new North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).  The numbers reported for previous years are based on 
the old Standard Industrial Classification System (SICS) industry group 7323, but only 
where information about consumer credit reporting agencies is broken out separately 
from mercantile credit reporting agencies.  Unfortunately, there is not enough publicly 
available information to calculate concentration ratios in years prior to 1997. 
Data on the number of credit reports issued, the number of credit bureaus, and the 
composition of ACB membership are from testimony provided by the organization in the 
transcripts of the 1970 and 1975 hearings in the House of Representatives.  Information 
on the organization of credit bureaus and the extent of automation in the late 1980s is 
from ACB testimony contained in the transcripts of the 1989 hearings in the House of 
Representatives.  The most recent data on the number of members and indicators of 
activity are from ACB’s web site, as reported in October 2001.  Information about the 
major credit bureaus' other lines of businesses were found on the companies' web sites. 
Errors in Consumer Credit Reports 
The aggregate statistics from ACB are from its response to questions printed in the 
transcripts of the September 1989 hearings in the House of Representatives (p. 855).  The 
same hearings report statistics for TRW that are comparable (p. 796, pp. 801-2).   
The statistic on the frequency of mismerge errors is from the study prepared by James R. 
Williams in 1989. Williams identified errors in the rating of an account (satisfactory or 
delinquent, for example) in about 13 percent of 350 credit reports.  This report was re-
printed in the transcripts to the June 1990 hearings in the House of Representatives (pp. 
517-39). 
The article refers to surveys conducted by two consumers groups.  The Consumers Union 
survey is reprinted in the transcripts of the June 1991 hearings in the House of 
Representatives (pp. 425-35).  The other is the Public Interest Research Group’s 1998 
study, which can be found at http://www.pirg.org/reports/consumer/mistakes/index.htm.  
The samples in these surveys are quite small, 57 and 131, respectively, and were not 
drawn randomly from the population of credit users.     
The statistics from the Arthur Andersen study are from the National Press Club speech by 
D. Barry Connelly, executive vice president of ACB.  While the sample size of the 
Andersen study is quite large—over 15,000 applicants who were denied credit—the 
results are based on a small set of those applicants.  About 1,200 requested copies of their 
credit report and about 300 of those disputed their reports.  In 36 of 267 instances 
analyzed, the lender reversed the credit decision.   